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cation of O'Callahan as "a clear break with the past" requiring consideration of the merits of retroactivity4 4 is the preferred road despite
its academic deficiencies. In this way, it can be applied prospectively
and yet distinguished from the immutable rule that judgments without jurisdiction are void.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL AGENTS

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
The Supreme Court in the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents 4 5 took an historic step by recognizing an aggrieved citizen's
federal common law right to sue "federal officers" who violate fourth
amendment prohibitions. 46 However, the Court left open the question
of sovereign immunity and remanded the case to the Second Circuit
for a ruling on that issue.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is essentially a creature of
judicial origin.47 Immunity from civil liability was first extended to
members of the judiciary.48 Later, this protection was also afforded to
free transcript on appeal). Contra, Dobbyn, Prospective Limitation of ConstitutionalDeci-

sions in Criminal Cases, 36 Mo. L. REv. 801, 804, (1971) (Dobbyn refutes the idea that the
Court has genuinely relied on the integrity of the fact-finding process and espouses the
view that the Court has applied new rules prospectively in cases where there has been
an uncalled for usurpation of legislative power). See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court
1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 56, 97-101 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 83 U. Cui. L. R v. 719 (1966).
44 See text accompanying note 34 supra.

45 403 US. 388 (1971).
46 The Court relied heavily on the principle announced in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
at 684 (1946): ". .. [W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done." (quoted in 403 U.S. at 396).
47 The Constitution establishes a privilege which is limited to members of Congress
and which, during the periods when that body is in session, shields the members from arrest
while they are in the conduct of their duties. The provision is intended to insure free speech
and debate in the Congress. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 6. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court first came to grips with the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a suit against a
state. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792), the Court held that the state of
Georgia was not a sovereign within the meaning of the doctrine and was not, therefore,
immune. This case subsequently led to the adoption of the eleventh amendment. However,
it was not until 1834 that the Court said, by way of dictum in United States v. Clarke, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, that the national government, when appearing as a party to a suit, is entitled to invoke this doctrine. Twelve years later, the doctrine became more firmly settled as
a principle of American jurisprudence in United States v. McLemore, 45 US. (4 How.) 286
(1846). Finally, in 1868, the Supreme Court stated that, "[it is a familiar doctrine of common law that a sovereign cannot be sued in his own court without his consent." The
Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154.
48 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Field said, "[flit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice, that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal conse-
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heads of executive departments 49 and then to other quasi-judicial and
administrative officials.5 0 The trend in recent cases has been to expand

the doctrine of immunity to cover even minor federal officials. 51
While the rank and type of federal officials protected has varied,
the basic rationale supporting the doctrine of immunity has remained
constant: in order to insure unhampered and effective governmental
administration, public officials who have broad authority and exercise
discretion must be permitted to make decisions free from the threat of
personal liability for the consequences of such decisions. 2
quences to himself." Id. at 347. The full import and extent of the privilege of judicial
immunity was reiterated in the more recent case of John v. Gibson, 270 F.2d 36 (9th Cir.
1959). See Pugh, HistoricalApproach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.

REv. 476 (1953).
49

Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US. 483 (1896).
50 It was not until 1959, in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, that the Supreme Court extended the concept of sovereign immunity to include lesser federal officials. In the majority
opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated, "[w]e do not think that the principle announced in
Vilas can properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank, and in fact it never
has been so restricted by the lower federal courts." Id. at 572. Mr. Justice Harlan's last
phrase seems to allude to a number of other decisions which had extended the doctrine to
lesser officials in the period between Vilas and Barr. For example, a landmark decision,
noted approvingly by the Supreme Court in Barr, was Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), where two successive Attorneys General, two
successive Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit and the Director of Immigration
were granted immunity. In Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), several federal officials, including an FBI agent, were granted immunity. Also, in Yaselli v. Goff, 12
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd mem., 275 US. 503 (1927), a special assistant to the Attorney
General was granted immunity.
S While Barr extended the doctrine to cover lesser officials (see note 50 supra), it also
sought to preclude lower courts from overextending the doctrine through its requirements
that the official be performing a discretionary function and that he be acting within the
scope of his authority (the latter being a requirement of Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896)). Despite the Barr decision, some courts, at least covertly, have continued to use
scope of authority as the sole criterion for granting immunity. See Scherer v. Brennan, 379
F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967) (suit against Treasury agents); Chavez v. Kelley, 364 F.2d 113 (10th
Cir. 1966) (suit against federal narcotics agents); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir. 1964) (suit against several federal officials including a U.S. Marshal); Bershad v. Wood,
290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961) (suit against Internal Revenue agents); Gamage v. Peal, 217
F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (suit against Air Force medical officers and a psychiatrist on
contract with the Air Force); Toscano v. Olesen, 189 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (suit
against postal inspector). Few courts have explicitly followed Barr and applied both tests.
See Chafin v. Pratt, 358 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1966) (suit against eight federal employees);
Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965) (suit against civilian supervisor in charge
of Air Force work crew).
52 Perhaps the most famous and often cited statement on this subject is that of Judge
Learned Hand:
The justification ... [for immunity] is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and
again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a
mistake in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to satisfy
a jury of his good faith.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Declining to follow the recent rulings of a number of other circuits, 53 the Second Circuit, in deciding the Bivens remand, has at-

tempted to limit the federal officials who fall within the penumbra of
the immunity doctrine.5 4
In his complaint, petitioner Bivens alleged that respondents,
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, entered his apartment and
arrested him for alleged violations of the narcotics laws. Respondents
handcuffed petitioner in front of his family and even threatened to
arrest them. Thereafter, his apartment was searched without a warrant
and he was taken to the federal courthouse where he was interrogated,
subjected to a visual strip search and booked.5 5 Petitioner brought suit,
alleging violation of his fourth amendment rights and seeking damages against each of the agents. 56
Following the Supreme Court analysis announced in Barr v.
Matteo57 the Second Circuit noted that the question of the applicability of sovereign immunity demands the resolution of two central issues.
53 In Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967), a suit was brought against
Treasury agents assigned to protect the President to recover damages on account of their
activities in conducting surveillance of the plaintiff. The court held that federal officials
acting within the scope of their authority are immune.
In Chavez v. Kelley, 364 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1966), a suit against a federal narcotics
agent for alleged slanderous statements, the court held that the statements were made in
pursuance of his official duties and hence were privileged under Barr v. Matteo. Unlike
Bivens, this case did not involve infringement of constitutional rights.
In Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965), a negligence suit was brought
against a civilian foreman working for the Air Force when an enlisted man working in
his crew was injured. Here, the court held that the defendant was acting within the scope
of his authority and was performing a discretionary function. It would seem that the court
gave a rather liberal meaning to the term "discretionary function." This case also represents the broadest extension of the immunity doctrine to date because it held that one can
acquire immunity through contract with the government.
Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), was a suit against several federal
officials, including a U.S. Marshal, for unlawful arrest and detention. The court held that
the defendants were acting within the scope of their authority and were thus immune.
This is perhaps the leading case in direct opposition to Bivens.
In Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961) the Ninth Circuit held that Internal
Revenue agents who had wrongfully levied on plaintiff's bank account were nevertheless
acting within the scope of their authority. The same court employed a similar rationale in
O'Campo v. Hadisty, 262 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958), a case that also involved IRS agents.
54 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
55 Id. at 1341-42.
56 The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that (1) there is no cause of
action for damages under the fourth amendment; and (2) even if there is, defendants
would still be protected by the immunity doctrine. 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on the basis of the first ground and did not rule on
the immunity question. 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1968).
57 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Harlan explained that
an official is immune if he performs ". . . discretionary acts at those levels of government
where the concept of duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary authority" and
the act complained of is ". . . within the outer perimeter of [the official's] line of
duty .. ." Id. at 575. See notes 50 & 51 supra.
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First, were the narcotics agents acting "within the outer perimeter of
[their] line of duty?""" Second, if the court answers the first question in
the affirmative, were the agents "performing the type of 'discretionary'
function that entitles them to immunity from suit?" 59
Concerning the scope of authority issue, the court held that the
narcotics agents, despite allegations that they lacked a warrant and
probable cause (and hence conducted an illegal search), did act within
the scope of their authority since the principal function of narcotics
agents is to make arrests in narcotics cases.60
However, the court rejected respondents' claim of immunity when
the second criterion was applied. The court explained that narcotics
agents and other federal officials engaged in similar police duties do
not perform "discretionary" acts that require the protection of the immunity doctrine.0 1 However, the court did state that the defense of
good faith and reasonable belief was available to the agents. 62
58 456 F.2d at 1343.
GOId. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit considered the question of immunity in light of both of these issues. Some circuits have treated the ,Barr requirements
lightly and have merely discussed whether the alleged act was within the defendant's
scope of authority. For example, in Norton v. McShane, 32 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), Judge
Rives explained that ".. . the test to determine the existence of immunity from suit for
monetary recovery based on allegedly wrongful conduct is whether or not the officers were
acting within the scope of their authority or in discharge of their duties." 382 F.2d at 857.
Similarly, in Scherer v. Brennan, a Seventh Circuit decision, Judge Duffy stated, "[ilt is
well established that federal officials cannot be personally liable in damages for an act
committed within the general scope of their official authority and in performance of their
official duties. 379 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1967). See note 51 supra.
60 456 F.2d at 1343. The court obviously gave a broad, perhaps overly broad, meaning
to the term "scope of authority" as applied to the defendants. In effect, the court seemed
to be saying that despite the fact that these agents may have conducted an illegal search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, such actions were still within their
scope of authority. This logical inconsistency was noted and treated differently in Hughes
v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962). There federal game wardens were accused of conducting an illegal search and seizure. In deciding the case, Judge Merrill stated, "[t]he
question is whether a search without a warrant and unsupported by arrest in violation of
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, can be said to fall within the
scope of the official duties of these appellees. In our view it cannot, and accordingly immunity does not extend to such conduct." Id. at 70.
01456 F.2d at 1849. The court's decision is novel in the sense that it held that the
defendants and certain other similar officials were not immune because they were not
performing "discretionary functions." Cases that have reached the same conclusion as
Bivens have employed different reasoning. These decisions seemingly have ignored the issue
of whether a federal official was performing a discretionary act. For example, in Hughes v.
Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962), defendants were found to be acting beyond their scope
of authority. See also Kelley v. Dunn, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965) (trespass by postal inspector was not within scope of authority); Ampey v. Thornton, 65 F. Supp. 216 (D.
Minn. 1946) (use of obscenities by FBI agent during an investigation was not within scope

of authority).
In Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), the court came to essentially
the same result as Bivens in holding that an FBI agent was not immune. This case, being
prior to Barr, did not consider "discretionary function" but merely said that the doctrine
applies only to higher officials.
62456 F.2d at 1847.
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In part, the court's refusal to grant immunity because of the absence of a "discretionary function" stems from its concern over the
"woeful laxity" of some overzealous law enforcement officials in complying with constitutional standards. The court fears that such laxity
would only be encouraged by granting immunity in these circum68
stances.
The court's decision to deny immunity to the defendants was
also a reaction to an anomalous situation existing under federal law.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act"4 permits an individual to sue
certain state officials, acting under color of law, for the violation of
constitutional rights. While the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of official immunity is still applicable in suits brought under
§ 1983, such immunity has been afforded only to judges 5 and legislators. 66 Conversely, the Court has expressly rejected claims of immunity
by a number of state law enforcement officials in such suits.67 Thus,
the scope of the immunity doctrine is often much narrower when applied to state than when applied to federal officials. The divergent
applications of the doctrine are most apparent in the differing results
reached in civil suits against law enforcement officials of the federal
and state governments.
Sensitive to this anomaly, the Second Circuit could see no reason
for denying immunity to state law enforcement officials while affording such protection to federal officials who perform similar or identical
tasks.66

It is clear that the Second Circuit's purpose in decisively delineating the scope of authority and discretionary function tests was to
unqualifiedly declare that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not
available to federal "policemen." However, it is extremely unfortunate
that the court chose to hold that these agents were acting within the
scope of their authority when the acts were so blatantly unconstitutional. By broadly construing the term "scope of authority" to encompass even this type of conduct, the court has, in effect, pronounced
that the scope of authority is no longer a consideration in applying the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the context of unconstitutional
searches. It would be dangerous to extend this elimination of the scope
63 Id. at 1346.
64 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972).
65 Pierson v. Ray, 286 U.S. 547 (1967).
66 Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 US. 867 (1951).
67 Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167 (1961); Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961).
68456 F.2d at 1346. Several other courts have commented on the absurdity of such a
position. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163
(3d Cir. 1971).
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of authority test to other applications of the sovereign immunity doctrine. 9 Such an extension would be in clear conflict with Barr and its
70
intended effect.
69 The danger of the Court's broad interpretation of scope of authority can be seen
in the following example: Suppose the warden of a federal penitentiary orders that a
prisoner, because of his uncooperative attitude, is to be placed in a 'strip cell' (one completely barren of any furnishings except a toilet and washbowl). His clothes, glasses and
reading materials are taken from him and he is forced to sleep naked on a concrete floor
without even a blanket. Furthermore, the prisoner is subjected to physical abuse by prison
guards and is poorly fed. In a suit by the prisoner against the warden for violation of his
eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the court would
attempt to apply the Livens" two-pronged test for sovereign immunity. Admittedly, a federal warden does perform a discretionary function and thus would meet this aspect of the
test. However, in applying the Bivens' definition of scope of authority along the lines
suggested by the Second Circuit, the court might hold that the main function of a warden
is to operate a prison and thus he would qualify for immunity despite his flagrant violation of the eighth amendment. See generally Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1972).
7O While Barr was intended as a limitation or qualification of the scope of authority
criterion (see note 51 supra), it certainly did not render that portion of the test for immunity academic as Bivens seems to have done.

